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Inflation Targeting: A Panel Approach
The Federal Reserve defines “monetary policy” as any strategy that influences money and credit,
which further affects GDP. These policies are used to promote maximum employment, stable
prices and moderate long-term interest rates. Generally, these policies can be differentiated by
the choice of target variables. Examples of monetary policy includes exchange rate targeting,
monetary targeting, among others. This paper will look at inflation targeting and investigate its
effect on macroeconomic variables.

Introduction
Policy-makers have the authority to define the monetary framework, this allows them make
decisions that promote economic growth and development. These frameworks are often defined
by the macroeconomic variable which they decide to target. Developing countries used to use
exchange rate targets in order to be able to promote competiveness, macroeconomic stability
and growth (Yagci [2001]). In this type of monetary framework, the central bank (or policy
makers) is willing to buy or sell foreign exchange in order to keep the exchange rate at a certain
level (pegged exchange rate) or within certain bands (pegged within bands). This framework
requires a high level international reserve, so the central bank can sell foreign currency when the
exchange rate is depreciating to counter this downward move, or buy back foreign currency in
the opposite case. Yagci (2001) highlights the main benefits of this regime: 1) can promote
stability and competiveness, if peg is credible and 2) can keep interest rate at a lower level. The
downside of this monetary policy framework is that it has limited capacity to absorb external
shocks, because if the country runs down its international reserve, the policy cannot be
maintained.
Developed countries were inclined to conduct a monetary policy based on monetary targets.
Mishkin (2000) states that this monetary framework was characterized by: 1) reliance on
information conveyed by a monetary aggregate (such as M1, M2, or other aggregate), 2)
announcement of targets for monetary aggregates and 3) some accountability mechanism to
prelude large and systematic deviations from the monetary aggregates. Around the decade of
1970, Germany, Switzerland, USA and UK adopted this framework due to high inflation concerns.
Germany used the sum of currency and bank deposits as monetary target, Switzerland used M1,
the USA used M2, whereas UK used a broader aggregate (M3). The former two countries were
successful controlling inflation using monetary aggregates, attributed to the partial reliance of
the monetarist K-percent rule of Milton Friedman.
On the other hand, as Mishkin (2000) continues his study, the US was not able to manage
monetary aggregates to achieve interest rate, unemployment rate and inflation rate targets,
three main goals of the Fed during 1970 decade. Over the course of 20 years, the Fed abandoned
the aggregate monetary framework when Greenspan testified in Congress saying that the Fed
will no longer use any monetary target as a guide to conduct monetary policy (Mishkin [2000]).
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After failure of controlling inflation rate using aggregate monetary targets, developed countries
started using inflation targeting. As of 2014, countries like Canada, New Zealand, Brazil, Chile, the
USA and 44 more countries have implemented the inflation target regime and 10 more countries
are in the process of implementing it. In this monetary framework an inflation target is set and
publicly announced, then policy-makers will do whatever best in order to achieve said goal.
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Figure 1 Number of countries that have adopted the Inflation Targeting Regimen by year. Author’s elaboration

Countries that have adopted this monetary framework have experienced lower and more stable
inflation rate. This two benefits help consumers and producers base their economic decisions
and plan ahead their consumption and investment plans, ultimately boosting GDP and economic
growth.
In this research project we will describe inflation and inflation targeting, along with more details
of its benefits. Then we test if there is sufficient evidence to support this advantages, and
determine how is this monetary framework related to economic development.

Inflation
As mentioned before, inflation can be defined as the general change of prices of good and
services and it measures the purchasing power of money: as inflation increases, every unit of
money can pay a smaller portion of goods and services. Although consumers are able to afford
less goods and services, a constant low and stable increase in prices keep businesses profitable.
When prices have too much volatility, produces and consumer may have a hard time making their
choices of production and consumption. On this matter Okun (1971) stated that this environment
of high volatility in prices jeopardize decision-makers “by exposing individuals to large risks with
respect to the value of their wealth and their income”.
After exposing such adverse qualities of inflation, some people may argue that an economy is
better off without inflation. The truth is that deflation (when prices in general decrease) is related
to much greater dangers: such as falling profits, increase of unemployment, and other problems
which can potentially yield an economic recession. So, even though high and volatile inflation is
bad for the economy, deflation can be worse.
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In general, if the general population expect a price increase in the future, they will increase their
short-term consumption, whereas if they expect a price fall in the future, they’ll postpone
present consumption and wait for the prices to fall. This latter situation can be dangerous to the
economy, because this reluctant consumption can decrease short-term GDP.
If prices have no variation at all (inflation rate equal to zero), producers have less incentive to
continue supplying goods and services. Inflation is said to be often underestimated, hence,
having an inflation rate close to zero is close to be in the deflation zone and all the concerns
related to it. Generally, policy-makers try to avoid zero inflation rate.
The question policy-makers have to answer is “how much price variation is good?” There is a
generally accepted concept where “low and steady” inflation improves the economic growth and
development. Consumers form their own future inflation expectation, based on past inflation
levels and other relevant information. If inflation is kept at a “steady” level, their inflation
expectation will not be far off actual inflation, which means that they can base their economic
decisions on their expected inflation. In this situation, consumers will not postpone their
consumption, because they know pieces will be higher on the next year, and this behavior boosts
the GDP in the short run.
Skeptics of this claim often ask “how low?” or “what is steady?” The answer of those last
questions varies and depends on which country we are dealing with. In general, developed
countries set their inflation target between 1% and 2%, while developing countries set their
targets from 2% up to 18%. Generally, policy-makers use 1% range around their targets so that
inflation can fluctuate around the target, but within the boundaries.

Inflation Targeting
There are different monetary frameworks. In this study we will focus on inflation targeting (IT)
regime and analyze the its effect on GDP and inflation rate. Svensson (1999) highlights the
characteristics of the inflation target regime: policy-makers state a quantitative inflation target
(usually 2% for developed economies), an explicit tolerance interval around the inflation target
(typically ±1%), and a compromise of achieving this target without having any other intermediate
targets. Some concerns related to these will be later discussed in greater detail.
This monetary framework has some requirements or “preconditions” as Batini and Laxton (2007)
describe inflation targeting. After studying emerging economies that have adopted IT, these
authors managed to identify four conditions: (i) institutional independence of the central bank,
(ii) well-developed technical infrastructure with which the central bank is able to make inflation
forecasts and other economic modeling that is deemed necessary, (iii) an economic structure
where prices are deregulated and are not too sensitive to changes in commodity prices or
exchange rate variations and (iv) a healthy financial system.
These are conditions for the smooth change towards the inflation targeting framework. However,
not meeting them have not been a hinder for implementing it on emerging economies. Batini
and Laxton (2006) concluded that, even though these preconditions are not met, developing
4

countries are capable of adopting this framework and that, after the implementation, the
“preconditions” are met, meaning that there are improvements in institutional independence,
and techniques structures.
Monetary policies are often divided in two strategies: discretionary frameworks and rule
frameworks. In the former kind of monetary-policy the central bank is free to act as it considers
it is suitable, given the short-term conditions. In rule frameworks, the central bank is bound to
respond according to a rule set, often counter-cyclical rules, like the Friedman k-percent, which
stated that the central bank should increase money supply on a fixed percentage each year
regardless the state of the economy, or the Taylor-rule, which move interest rate depending on
the behavior of GDP growth and the inflation rate. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) agree to identify
the inflation targeting regime as “constrained discretion”. They argue that the IT framework is
not a rule in the sense that the changes in policy are not a reaction provoked by certain
macroeconomic conditions, but it relies on the discretion of the central bankers to use their
structural and judgmental models of the economy to determine the policy actions that will help
them achieve the inflation target. So this monetary framework is ruled by the overriding goal of
inflation, but relies on the discretion of the policy-makers to achieve that goal.
There are some concerns about some definitions related to this monetary framework. What does
it mean that inflation rate is the only priority of the policy-makers relative to other variables
(unemployment, exchange rate…)? Which inflation should be used? Which should be the
inflation target?
Even though policy-makers refer to inflation as the “overriding goal” of monetary policy, they
usually leave an “escape clause” for secondary objectives. Developing countries that have
adopted this framework often have exchange rate secondary targets, because they are very
vulnerable to international shocks, such as oil prices variations and changes in monetary policy
of developed countries (like USA or the ECB).
There is a discussion on whether the inflation target should be a point (a specific target number
surrounded with an upper and lower bound) or a range (minimum and maximum inflation).
Hammond (2012) states that having a target point give the public a very clear signal of what the
objective inflation is and using the bands around the target, the general population can estimate
the mid-term inflation level. Using a target range it is very easy to check if the target was hit or
missed, but they have the disadvantage that might imply that “the central bank has imprecise
control over inflation objective”, as Hammond (2012) continues.
There are multiple measures of inflation within an economy, consumer inflation, producer
inflation, core inflation, and such. Given this variety of price variation, which one should we use
for target? Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) answer this question and respond stating that central
banks should use the inflation measure that is generally considered accurate, timely and readily
understood by the public. The selected inflation should also be flexible enough to capture price
shocks, which the monetary policy will intend to smooth out. Every country that have adopted
the IT regime has chosen one measure of inflation and has not changed ever since.
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The next question that ought to be answer is “what should be the target level?” This monetary
policy framework sets its target to a level of inflation that will help the economy grow to its
potential GDP. This is intended to produce different benefits to the economy, such as reducing
inflation and GDP volatility. Countries that have adopted this framework have, on average, lower
inflation than those countries that have not adopted it.
Some critics of the inflation targeting regimen argue that the inflation is very difficult to control
due to the lags under which the monetary policy operates. This problem is worse for emerging
market countries, as Mishkin (2000) analyzed. These countries often face very high inflations that
are meant to be brought down, but the monetary policy operates with very long lags and their
forecast models often yield large errors. This combination of issues affects the central bank
credibility of its ability of achieving the inflation target. However, in the sample used in this study
there are 17 countries with lower middle income and low income1 that have successfully adopted
this monetary framework and have lower and steadier inflation.
Inflation rate
of Low Income and Lower Middle Income Countries
40.0%

14.6%

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

45.0%
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%

Figure 2 Average rate of inflation of 17 low income and lower middle income countries. Author's elaboration.

Approximated ten years after the “birth” of inflation targeting framework, Neumann and von
Hagen (2002) tested the benefits of adopting this monetary policy. They concluded that the
countries with this framework had lower inflation rates and less inflation volatility, and they said
that those countries “converged closely to the stability performance of the Bundesbank”.
Not so long after Neumann and von Hagen (2002) publication, Ball and Sheridan (2003)
conducted a similar study and noted that the decrease in inflation that inflation-targeting
countries experienced was also present on non inflation-targeting countries. They asserted that

1

Armenia, Bangladesh, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Moldova,
Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Ukraine.
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the decrease on inflation and its volatility was nothing but a mean regression effect, so whether
a country adopted the inflation targeting regime had no effect whatsoever.
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Figure 3 Average inflation rate for countries with inflation targeting framework and countries without it. Author's elaboration

Miller et al (2012) compiled different studies regarding inflation targeting and its impact on
economic performance. After comparing all the research, he concluded that the inflation
targeting regime does not affect economic performance in developed countries, but it has
positive effects on developing countries. Similarly, Walsh (2009) investigated the benefits of the
IT regime and concluded that the decrease in inflation (and inflation volatility) was more evident
in developing countries rather than developed countries. He argues that developed countries
adopted this monetary policy framework in periods where their inflation was already low or
stable. For this reason, there is no clear evidence, for developed countries, of the benefits of the
IT scheme. However, developing countries that adopted the IT have lowered their inflation level,
volatility as well as reduction in GDP growth volatility (Gonçalves and Salles [2006]).
Non-macroeconomics benefits include an increase in transparency. Policy-makers try to be
transparent and trustworthy so that the general public may trust them and start making their
economic decisions based on the promised inflation target, this is called “anchoring” inflation
expectations. For this reason, in this regimen, the expected inflation is a very important variable
for the policy-makers. Bordo and Siklos (2014) defined central bank credibility as a “commitment
to follow well-articulated and transparent rules and policy goals”. They conclude that the central
bank credibility level of inflation targeting countries is similar to credibility levels during the gold
standard period.
Another of these benefits is the increase of accountability. Alongside the declaration of the
inflation target, there are penalties for the policy-makers if they do not meet their goals in the
right time. Every time this target is not met, people in general may start losing their “anchor” to
the inflation, and the policy-makers may lose their credibility. In order to boost the
trustworthiness and transparency, those in charge of the monetary policy improve their
7

communication towards the general public, usually this is done using monthly announcements.
One of the most important benefits is the independence of the policy-makers. By not being
influenced by the government, monetary policy can be performed so that it can achieve the
inflation target and not having any other intermediate goal.
Even though many benefits have been attributed to the inflation targeting regimen, Epstein
(2003) argued that none are a consequence of this regime, but to other policy measures that are
used in this monetary framework. Epstein (2003) claims that countries with IT regime has
accomplished to lower inflation rate has done so at the same “output-price” as countries without
IT regime. Further more, he says that all the countries use the same instrument to lower inflation
rate: increase interest rate.
This research project will investigate the benefits of the IT framework stated above. Particularly
we will study the effect of this regime on GDP and inflation, using information of 47 inflation
targeting countries and 82 non-inflation targeting countries from 1990 to 2014. Table 1 show the
distribution of the countries, by the World Bank classification, used in the sample and Table 2
shows the detailed list of countries. The selection criterion was based on information availability:
we choose those countries that had at least 50% of the observation for GDP, Inflation, Capital
formation, Labor, and Government deficit. For those cases where the time observations were not
consecutive, a linear approximation was used to fill in the missing observation.
Table 1: Country distribution

High Income
Low Income

World Bank Classification
High income: OECD
High income: nonOECD
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
Low income
Total

IT Countries Non-IT Countries Total
15
12
27
1
16
17
16
17
33
12
22
34
3
15
18
47
82
129

Table 1: County distribution by classification. Source: World Bank database

In general, high income countries have experienced a GDP growth of 0.76% from 2000 to 2013.
For most of this period, IT countries had higher GDP than non-IT countries. From 2009 the
average GDP for IT countries has fallen, and this is partly explained by the fact that since that
year, the lower end of high income countries has adopted this monetary framework which has
lowered the average GDP of the IT countries, while the upper end of high income countries
(mainly non-OECD countries) has not implemented this regime.
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Figure 4 Average GDP for high income countries. Author's elaboration

High income countries that use the inflation targeting as monetary framework experienced lower
inflation than those countries that don’t use IT. Even though, the inflation targeting is related to
decrease inflation rate and reduce its volatility, it does not make countries immune to external
shocks. Prove to this claim is the increase in inflation rate in 2008 for all countries. During this
year we experienced what many economists claim to be the “worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression”. During these years, different banks declared bankruptcy and had to shut down their
operations, like Lehman Brothers in the USA. After this financial crisis, IT-countries managed to
keep a lower inflation rate than non IT-countries.
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Figure 5 Average inflation rate for high income countries. Author’s elaboration.

Figure 6 shows the evolution of the average GDP for low income countries. In this graph we can
see that low income countries that implemented inflation targeting have higher GDP than those
countries that have not applied this monetary regime.
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Figure 6 Average GDP for low income countries. Author’s elaboration.

Figure 7 shows the behavior of the inflation rate for this group of countries. For both IT-countries
and non IT-countries inflation rate have been roughly the same over the years, however, ITcountries experienced lower inflation rate during the 2008 financial crisis than the non ITcountries.
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Figure 7 Average inflation rate for low income countries. Author's elaboration

Methodology
For this investigation we will use an unbalanced panel data collected from 1990 to 2014 for 129
countries. When using this type of data, the estimation of the parameters is based on fixed effects
or on random effect models. The former is used when it is presumed that there is an unobserved
effect that is correlated with each explanatory variable in all periods. This methodology subtracts
the time average to each individual, which will eliminate the unobserved effect (because it is
believed its constant). The latter methodology assumes that there is some sort of correlation
between the explanatory variables and the unobserved effect. In order to estimate the
parameters, the random effect methodology subtracts a portion of the time average to each
10

individual that depends on the variance of the error term, variance of the unobserved effect and
the number of time periods and then estimates the parameters using generalized least squares.
We will use in this investigation the fixed effect and pooled OLS estimations and specify the
following regressions:
+
𝑦",$ = 𝛽' + 𝛽) 𝑦",$*) + 𝛽+ 𝐼𝑛𝑓",$*) + 𝛽/ 𝐼𝑛𝑓",$*)
+ 𝛽0 𝑘",$ + 𝛽2 𝑙",$ + 𝛽4 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐",$ + 𝛿) 𝐼𝑇",$ + 𝜖
+
𝐼𝑛𝑓",$ = 𝛽' + 𝛽) 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝",$ + 𝛽+ 𝑖",$ + 𝛽/ 𝐼𝑛𝑓",$*) + 𝛽0 𝐼𝑛𝑓",$*)
+ 𝛿) 𝐼𝑇",$ + 𝜐

where y represents the logarithm of the GDP in current US dollars; Inf is the inflation rate, k is
the gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP; l is the total labor force as a percentage of
total population, educ correspond to education, GovExp is the government current account
balance as a percentage of the GDP and i is the real interest rate. We include the inflation term
squared in order to capture marginal effects of this variable. Table 3 summarizes the list of
variables used in this study. The variable of interest for the investigation is the dummy variable
IT. Results of the fixed effect and pooled OLS estimates are presented in Table 4.
In general, lagged GDP and capital formation were statistically significant in the determination of
the GDP, determining between 0.95% to 0.99% and 0.20% to 0.50%, respectively. Total labor
didn’t have a statistically significant impact over GDP, according to the pooled OLS estimates, but
the opposite using the fixed effect estimations. According to the latter methodology, total labor
is related with an increase of output between 0.40% and 0.50%. Different measures of education,
as an approximation of productivity, did not have a significant impact on GDP. Even though both
methodologies captured decreasing marginal effects of inflation rate on GDP, this effect is very
small (close to 0) and not statistically significant.
For both methodologies and controlling for different measures of education, inflation had a very
small effect (ranging from 0.20% to 1.81%) on GDP and it is not statistically significant. Judging
by the R-squared, the pooled OLS model explained 99% of the GDP determination, whereas the
fixed effect model explained 89%. The former methodology shows that this monetary framework
has a positive effect of 0.80% after controlling for primary and secondary enrollment, whereas
for these same productivity measures, the fixed effect model shows an impact of 1.81%.
Using a sample of countries with high income (using the World Bank classification) we estimated
the effects of adopting the inflation targeting frame work using fixed effects model. For these
countries, this adoption is not statistically significant, but its related to positive effects that ranges
from 1.31% to 3.15%, however controlling for tertiary education, the adoption of this framework
has a negative effect of 0.20%. Repeating the same analysis for low income countries, we get a
positive relationship between this monetary regime and GDP, meaning that the adoption of the
inflation targeting framework increases the GDP between 1.01% and 1.51%, however this
relationship is not statistically significant. For this group of countries, after controlling for
secondary education enrollment we get a negative relationship between IT and GDP, but it is not
statistically significant. Detailed results are shown in Table 5.
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Different methodologies and different samples yielded mixed evidence of the relationship
between IT framework and GDP determination. In general, this regime has a positive relationship
with GDP (the adoption of the IT framework increases GDP), but there is not enough evidence to
conclude that the relationship is significant.
Analyzing the inflation specification previously described we found that the government current
account balance plays a significant role determining inflation rate; the pooled OLS showed that
marginal increase of the current account balance is related with a decrease of 0.057 in inflation,
however the fixed effect model showed a similar relationship, but a higher magnitude (0.079 vs
0.057). Both methodologies showed the expected relationship between inflation rate and real
interest rate. A marginal increase of real interest rate is related with a 0.18 and 0.25 decrease in
inflation, for the pooled OLS and fixed effect model, respectively. The pooled OLS model captured
marginal effect of lagged inflation, showing marginal decreasing return on inflation, however,
this effect was not captured by the fixed effect model.
According to the pooled OLS results, adopting inflation targeting regime is related with a
decrease in inflation rate of 0.74, but this effect is higher when used the fixed effect methodology
(0.75 vs 0.74). Although these estimates show the right sign, only the pooled OLS estimates are
statistically significant. Table 6 shows the results in detail.
In Table 7 we show the results for the fixed effect model using high and low income countries.
Current account balance has more weight determining inflation in high income countries than
low income one (0.124 vs 0.016). For low income countries, inflation rate showed a stronger
inertial component than high income countries (0.134 vs 0.101), but for both group of countries,
this variable was not statistically significant. For both type of countries, the real interest rate was
statistically significant and was related to a decrease of inflation of 0.22 (for high income
countries) and 0.30 (for low income countries).
Using high income countries, the fixed effect model showed that the adoption of the inflation
targeting framework was related to a decrease in inflation of 1.99, but for low income countries
this monetary framework is associated with an increase in inflation of 0.623. This last result has
the opposite sign that it was expected. We analyzed the inflation rate at the year of adoption of
the low income countries and noticed that for some years, new countries adopting this monetary
framework had higher inflation rate than the low income countries that already were using this
regime.
Philippines, in 2002, was the first low (middle) income country that adopted IT regime, and it had
a 2.72 inflation rate. The following year, Bangladesh adopted this regime, with an inflation rate
of 5.66%. In 2005, Guatemala changed its monetary framework for the IT regime and had an
inflation rate of 9.10%. This might be a partial explanation of why the fixed effect estimator had
a positive relationship between inflation rate and the adoption of IT regime, instead of a negative
one.

12

So far we have studied the effects of Inflation Targeting on GDP and inflation rate, however
nothing has been said about the inverse relationship. A very interesting question to answer would
be: what is the causality relationship between these variables? Given that there are many
countries with different GDP levels and inflation rates that adopt this monetary regime, it is not
entirely clear which is the causal relationship. It is hard to say if countries adopt the IT regime
because the have “high” GDP and “low” inflation rate, or if they achieve “high” GDP and “low”
inflation rate because the implemented this monetary framework. The decision to adopt IT is not
well understood and could be influenced by many other factors that were not taken into account
in this study.

Conclusion
The Inflation Targeting Regime was first adopted by New Zealand in 1989. This monetary policy
framework requires policy-makers to commit to a target inflation that is consistent with the
potential GDP growth, so that the general population would base their economic decision upon
that inflation target. In theory, the IT regime can potentially decrease inflation, reduce the
volatility of inflation and GDP growth, but this positive effects are more evident in developed
countries rather than developing countries. This thesis project studied these benefits using data
of 58 inflation targeting countries and 71 non-inflation targeting countries from 1990 to 2014.
The panel evidence show that there is a small positive relationship between this monetary policy
framework and GDP, but it is not statistically significant. In this study we found that the effects
of IT regime on GDP are greater in high income countries than on developing countries, which is
different to what is commonly found in other investigations.
The adoption of inflation targeting is linked to a decrease of inflation rate, although not
statistically significant. We found that in developing countries this relationship is opposite to the
theoretical correlation, due to the constant increase of inflation level of new developing
countries that implement the IT regime.
Even though the results shown are not statistically significant, there are non-economic benefits
related to this monetary framework that are not considered in this study. The inflation target
framework helps the central bank to have more independence to conduct monetary policy and
also increases the accountability, so that this entity is not left alone to do what it pleases with no
consequences.

Further research
This investigation could be improved if more observations are added. Using more observations,
estimations are more precise, with which we could draw better conclusions on what is the
relationship between inflation targeting regime and GDP and inflation rate. More observations
can be obtained by relaxing the selection criteria that is used: in this investigation we only used
countries that had at least 50% of information on GDP, Inflation, Capital formation, Labor, and
Government deficit.
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Generally, the relationship between IT and other macroeconomic variables is studied using time
series models. However, this can be also analyzed using panel data that accounts for time
variations. In order to improve further researches, we recommend using more lags of time
variables, doing this will capture any autocorrelation that might be implied in the model. Another
issue worth considering is endogeneity: since it is not very clear the decision process of countries
to adopt the inflation targeting framework, having this framework as an endogenous variable is
a possibility that should be taken into account for additional research.
Further investigations should be able to test the causal relationship between the adoption of the
Inflation Targeting regime and GDP and inflation rate. This will shed more light on the matters of
which conditions are necessary for the implementation of this framework and have a clear idea
of what the benefits are.
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Annex
Table 2: List of countries used

Country
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador

Classification
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
High income: OECD
Upper middle income
High income: nonOECD
High income: nonOECD
High income: nonOECD
Upper middle income
High income: OECD
Upper middle income
Low income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
High income: nonOECD
Upper middle income
Low income
Low income
Low income
Lower middle income
High income: OECD
Low income
Low income
Upper middle income
Low income
Low income
Upper middle income
High income: nonOECD
High income: nonOECD
High income: OECD
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income

Inflation Targeting since
2009

2006
1993
2014

2013

2006

1991

1999

2011

2012
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Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Greece
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Honduras
Hong Kong SAR, China
Hungary
Iceland
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Latvia
Lesotho
Luxembourg
Macao SAR, China
Macedonia, FYR
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico

Lower middle income
Lower middle income
High income: nonOECD
High income: OECD
Low income
Upper middle income
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
Low income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
High income: nonOECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
Upper middle income
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
Upper middle income
High income: OECD
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
High income: OECD
High income: nonOECD
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
High income: nonOECD
Lower middle income
High income: OECD
High income: nonOECD
Upper middle income
Low income
Upper middle income
Low income
High income: nonOECD
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income

1993

2001
2001

1997

2013
2015
1998

2000
17

Bangladesh
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Oman
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Georgia
United Kingdom
United States

Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Low income
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
Lower middle income
High income: OECD
High income: nonOECD
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
High income: nonOECD
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
High income: nonOECD
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
High income: OECD
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
High income: OECD
Upper middle income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
High income: OECD
High income: OECD
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Low income
Upper middle income
High income: nonOECD
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
High income: OECD
High income: OECD

2003

1989
2001

2001
1998

2005

2000
1995

1995
2000

2000

2006
2009
1992
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Uruguay
Vanuatu
Yemen, Rep.
Ghana
Guatemala
Indonesia
Kenya
Malawi
Moldova
Mongolia
Mozambique
Niger
Pakistan
Philippines

High income: nonOECD
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income
Low income
Lower middle income
Upper middle income
Low income
Low income
Lower middle income
Lower middle income

Sri Lanka
Lower middle income
Uganda
Low income
Ukraine
Lower middle income
Table 2: List of countries used in this study.

2007

2007
2005
2005
2014
2012
2010
2012

2002
2011
2015
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Table 3: Variable List
Variable

Description

GDP

GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data
are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from
domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a
few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the
rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an
alternative conversion factor is used.

Gross capital
formation

Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment)
consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy
plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery,
and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways,
and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are
stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected
fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress."
According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also
considered capital formation.

Inflation

Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the
annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of
acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or
changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula
is generally used.

Labor force

Total labor force comprises people ages 15 and older who meet the
International Labour Organization definition of the economically
active population: all people who supply labor for the production of
goods and services during a specified period. It includes both the
employed and the unemployed. While national practices vary in the
treatment of such groups as the armed forces and seasonal or parttime workers, in general the labor force includes the armed forces,
the unemployed, and first-time job-seekers, but excludes
homemakers and other unpaid caregivers and workers in the
informal sector.

Real interest
rate

Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation
as measured by the GDP deflator.

Current Account
Balance

Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods and
services, net primary income, and net secondary income.

20

Primary school
enrollment

Gross enrolment ratio. Primary. Total is the total enrollment in
primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of
the population of official primary education age. GER can exceed
100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students
because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.

Secondary school
enrollment

Gross enrolment ratio. Secondary. All programmes. Total is the total
enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as
a percentage of the population of official secondary education age.
GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and underaged students because of early or late school entrance and grade
repetition.

Tertiary school
enrollment

Gross enrolment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total
enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age,
expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year
age group following on from secondary school leaving.

Source: World Bank database.
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Table 4: Results from estimations (dependent variable: log(GDP))
Method
Inflation
Targeting
Lagged
log(GDP)
Lagged
Inflation
Rate
Lagged
Inflation
Rate
Squared
Capital
Formation
Total Labor
Primary
Education
Secondary
Education
Tertiary
Education
Intercept

N
Total Sum
of Squares
R Squared
Adjusted
F-statistic
(p-value)

0.004
(0.008)
0.997***
(0.001)

Pooled OLS
0.008
0.008
(0.008)
(0.008)
0.996*** 0.996***
(0.001)
(0.002)

0.005
(0.008)
0.996***
(0.002)

0.010
(0.011)
0.980***
(0.006)

Fixed Effect
0.018
0.016
(0.012)
(0.013)
0.976*** 0.977***
(0.007)
(0.008)

0.002
(0.013)
0.949***
(0.008)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
0.000

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000*
(0.000)

-0.000.
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
0.000

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000.
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)
-0.000
0.000
0.001
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.003***
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)
0.005***
(0.001)

0.003***
(0.000)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.000)

0.003***
(0.000)
0.004*
(0.002)

0.005***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.002)

0.000
(0.000)

0.001
(0.000)

0.082**
(0.031)

0.056.
(0.033)

0.112**
(0.037)

0.000
(0.000)
0.126**
(0.043)

0.002***
(0.000)

2,750
14,300

2,381
12,571

2,131
10,982

1,955
9,530

2,750
865.66

2,381
646.4

2,131
570.38

0.994

0.993

0.993

0.993

0.902

0.890

0.884

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

1,955
529.56
0.884
0.000

Table 4 Results from pooled OLS and fixed effect estimations. Dependent variable: log(GDP).
Standard Error in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 0%; ** indicates significance at 1%; *
indicates significance at 5%, . indicates significance at 10%.
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Table 5: Results from fixed effect estimations for low and high income countries.
Dependent variable: log(GDP)
Method
Inflation
Targeting
Lagged
log(GDP)
Lagged
Inflation
Rate
Lagged
Inflation
Rate
Squared
Capital
Formation
Total Labor

0.013
0.013
0.969***
(0.008)

High Income
0.020
0.031*
(0.014)
(0.015)
0.968*** 0.966***
(0.009)
(0.010)

-0.002
(0.015)
0.921***
(0.011)

0.012
(0.023)
0.983***
(0.011)

Low Income
0.011
-0.012
(0.024)
(0.024)
0.975*** 0.965***
(0.011)
(0.015)

-0.000**
(0.000)

-0.000**
(0.000)

-0.000.
(0.000)

-0.000**
(0.000)

-0.000**
(0.000)

-0.000**
(0.000)

-0.000**
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

0.000***
(0.000)

0.000**
(0.000)

0.000*
(0.000)

0.000***
(0.000)

0.000**
(0.000)

0.000*
(0.000)

0.000**
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.002***
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.002)

0.003***
(0.001)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.000
(0.001)

0.004***
(0.001)
0.006**
(0.002)

0.006***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.002)

0.003***
(0.001)
0.006*
(0.003)

0.002**
(0.001)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002***
(0.000)

0.003***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.003)

0.003***
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)

Primary
Education
Secondary
Education
Tertiary
Education
N
Total Sum
of Squares
R Squared
Adjusted
F-statistic
(p-value)

-0.000
(0.000)

0.015
(0.026)
0.949***
(0.015)

0.003***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.000)

0.007***
(0.002)

1,685
553

1,454
384

1,392
365

1,285
346

1,065
311

927
261

739
205

670
182

0.907

0.888

0.887

0.891

0.889

0.887

0.871

0.865

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Table 5 Results from fixed effect estimations for low and high income countries. Dependent
variable: log(GDP). Standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 0%; ** indicates
significance at 1%; * indicates significance at 5%, . indicates significance at 10%.
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Table 6: Results from pooled OLS and fixed effect estimations. Dependent variable:
Inflation.

Method
Inflation Targeting
(dummy)
Government Current
Account Balance
Lagged Inflation Rate
Lagged Inflation Rate
Squared
Real Interest Rate
Intercept

Pooled OLS
-0.741*
(0.326)
-0.057***
(0.012)
0.739***
(0.049)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.179***
(0.018)
2.968***
(0.303)

Fixed Effects
-0.751
(0.832)
-0.079***
(0.024)
0.086
(0.063)
0.003*
(0.001)
-0.248***
(0.021)

N
834
834
Total Sum of Squares
24,218
12,094
R Squared Adjusted
0.414
0.178
F-statistic (p-value)
0.000
0.000
Table 6 Results from pooled OLS and fixed effect estimations. Dependent variable: Inflation.
Standard error in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 0%; ** indicates significance at 1%; *
indicates significance at 5%, . indicates significance at 10%.

24

Table 7: Results from fixed effect estimations for high and low income countries.
Dependent variable: Inflation

Classification
Inflation Targeting
(dummy)
Government Current
Account Balance
Lagged Inflation Rate
Lagged Inflation Rate
Squared
Real Interest Rate

High Income
-1.999*
(0.976)
-0.124***
(0.027)
0.101
(0.081)
0.003*
(0.002)
-0.223***
(0.024)

Low Income
0.623
(1.486)
-0.016
(0.042)
0.134
(0.173)
-0.000
(0.007)
-0.304***
(0.041)

N
517
317
Total Sum of Squares
6,199
5,894
R Squared Adjusted
0.209
0.166
F-statistic (p-value)
0.000
0.00
Table 7 Results from fixed effect estimations for high and low income countries. Dependent
variable: Inflation. Standard error in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 0%; ** indicates
significance at 1%; * indicates significance at 5%, . indicates significance at 10%.
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